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Abstract
We propose an evolutionary game to analyze the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous
economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii)
a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic
integration.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze how tolerance, which we define as a generic ability to accept diversity,
is affected by wealth distribution between two economically interacting social groups. As pointed
out by Tabellini (2010) and Florida (2004), intolerant behaviour affects economic growth and social
development by reducing trust and cooperation among economic agents, obstructing the free move-
ment of ideas and talents and favoring corruption and political patronage.
Furthermore, Bjornskov (2004) discusses the importance of individuals’ tolerance for economic
growth, showing that inequality reduces growth but mainly in societies where people perceive it
as being relatively unfair. However we ascertain a substantial lack of theoretical economic models
about the determinants and social dynamics of tolerance. To the best of our knowledge, one of the
first theoretical papers on this topic is Corneo and Jeanne (2009). The authors propose a theory of
tolerance using the approach of symbolic values in which benevolent parents select their children’s
values. They argue that society may be trapped in an intolerant equilibrium; moreover, moving
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from an intolerant to a tolerant society would increase aggregate income. Correani et. al. (2010)
propose an overlapping generations model, showing that the incentives that influence descendants’
predisposition to tolerance depend on both institutional factors, where behaviour is imposed by
rules and social (or cultural) factors. The authors confirm the absolute impossibility of affirming
tolerance through formal rules. Intolerance is a persistent attitude and its control requires continu-
ous interventions on the educational processes of new generations. Recently, Muldoon et al. (2011)
develop two models of rational motivation for toleration. Key to the first model is an application of
David Ricardo’s theory of trade and his related notion of comparative advantage. In their second
model the authors assume one-on-one interactions between members of a society, where the suc-
cessful establishment of a link between two agents is constrained by their level of tolerance. The
principal findings of Muldoon et al. (2011) are that individuals should be rationally motivated to
become more tolerant, but only under specific conditions. First, it is necessary heterogeneity in
the population; second, individuals must have some material interests; third, agents must have a
relatively small number of the skills available in the society.
The mathematical model developed in the present article relates to the literature on the evolution
of social preferences (Bisin and Verdier, 1998, 2001; Pichler, 2010) and is a natural continuation
of economic studies on fundamentalism (Iannaccone, 1997; Arce and Sandler, 2003, 2008; Epstein
and Gang, 2007) and social tolerance (Corneo and Jeanne, 2009; Correani et al., 2010; Muldoon
et al., 2011). To assess the evolution of tolerance in the society, we use the replicator dynamics
(Weibull, 1998), which implicitly assumes that tolerant and intolerant behaviour spreads on the
grounds of a selection process: the behaviour (strategy) that gives a higher payoff tends to spread
in the society. We introduce a random pairwise matching where two randomly selected agents are
involved in an economic transaction (for example a working relationship or a business deal) which
produces an amount of wealth that is assigned to the agents on the grounds of their initial economic
contribution. Substantially, we assume that a group (group 1) is richer than the other and an agent
of group 1 gives a greater contribution in producing wealth than the poorest agent of group 2.
Obviously, the economic transaction is strongly affected by the type of agents involved in it (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000) and, in particular, it is not carried out if the actors are agents of different
groups and at least one of them is intolerant; as a matter of fact, a fully tolerant society is a Pareto
dominant equilibrium, allowing the highest production of wealth.
The model produces a large number of different scenarios, but only in one case tolerance is a globally
stable steady state, confirming the empirical evidence that intolerance is much more common and
persistent than tolerance (Corneo and Jeanne, 2009). In particular, we will show that the selection
process of dominant behaviour is strongly affected by wealth distribution and agents’ perception
of cultural differences among social groups. In other words, as stated in the empirical analysis of
Becchetti et al. (2007) ’not only growth but also the distribution of growth dividends matters’ for
the diffusion of tolerance. Notably, we find that, even assuming an identical initial capital endow-
ment of the two groups (economic integration), the hypothesis of fairness in the allocation of wealth
produced with the economic interaction implies the dissemination of intolerance. Thus, tolerance
requires persisting differences in the distribution of produced wealth (group 1 should remain richer
than group 2). This strange phenomenon is less prominent if an agent’s perception of diversity is
less marked, that is if cultural integration between the two groups is reinforced. These theoretical
results suggest that cultural integration should precede economic integration.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follow. Section 2 describes the model and
discusses the main results. Section 3 analyses the welfare implications of the evolutionary dynamics
of social tolerance. Section 4 contains our conclusions and provides prospects for further research.
2 The model
We assume that a population of N economic agents is divided in two differentiated groups. Differ-
ences, such as ethnicity, religion, country of origin and social class are almost immediately recogniz-
able. We indicate with Ni the number of members of group i, for i = 1, 2 and N1 +N2 = N . The
cardinality of each group is supposed large enough, i.e. Ni > 1, for each i = 1, 2. For the sake of
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x1 xˆ1 x2 xˆ2
x1 pi11, pi11 pi11, pi11 pi12 − (α1 + c1), pi21 − (α2 + c2) 0, 0
xˆ1 pi11, pi11 pi11, pi11 0, 0 0, 0
x2 pi21 − (α2 + c2), pi12 − (α1 + c1) 0, 0 pi22, pi22 pi22, pi22
xˆ2 0, 0 0, 0 pi22, pi22 pi22, pi22
Table 1: Payoffs of the interaction. The heading of the Table points to tolerant (xi) and intolerant (xˆi)
agents of group i. The generic couple (ai, aj) describes the payoffs of the agents in the i-th row and j-th
column.
simplicity, Ni is assumed to be constant in time, i.e. population do not grow nor decrease. Each
individual can be tolerant or intolerant towards the agents of the opposite group. We also assume
that the percentage of tolerant varies in time. Let 0 ≤ xti ≤ 1 be the share of tolerant agents in
group i at time t. In order to simplify our analysis, the explicit reference to time will be omitted
whenever possible. Society is shared among tolerant and intolerant individuals:
2∑
i=1
xiNi +
2∑
i=1
xˆiNi = N, (1)
where xˆi = 1− xi, for i = 1, 2.
Let us suppose that agents interact after being randomly matched, obtaining payoffs constant in
time according to the following table:
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
In general, piij > 0 is the gain obtained by an agent of group i when she interacts with an
agent of group j. When interaction involves two agents of the same group, each of them obtains
piii > 0 irrespective of their real attitude (tolerance or intolerance). The interaction between agents
of different groups is more complex because their attitude to accept diversity can affect the outcome
of the transaction. Indeed, by definition, intolerance rules out any interaction with the agents of
different groups. The intolerant individual ’builds’ around her an exclusive network of relations
excluding all the individuals of the other groups; therefore, we conclude that interaction does not
occur if the involved actors belong to two different groups, and if one of them is intolerant. In this
case each agent gains 01. Tolerance, here, is the willingness to engage with others, regardless of their
ideological commitments. When interaction involves tolerant agents of two different groups i and j
they respectively obtain, piij − (αi + ci) and piji − (αj + cj). More specifically, anyone who accept
to interact with an agent of the rival group sustains both a psycological cost αi in terms of loss of
identity (see Akerlof et al., 2000) and a social cost ci paid by the agents because their behaviour is
disapproved by intolerant individuals. The psychological cost αi is assumed to depend on the payoff
piii, i.e. αi = αi(piii) with ∂αi/∂piii > 0. Social costs depend on the level of tolerance measured by
the shares x1 and x2; we assume the function ci = βci (x1, x2), i = 1, 2, β > 0, with the following
properties 2:
(1) ∂ci∂x1 < 0,
∂ci
∂x2
< 0;
(2) ∂
2c1
∂x21
≥ 0, ∂2c2
∂x22
≥ 0;
1However, an agent who is highly intolerant of others may partner with an agent that she is intolerant of, but we
assume that the relationship will be strained and less fruitful than a more amicable partnership: also in this case we
assume that each agent gains 0 (see Muldoon et al. 2011).
2As in Muldoon et al. (2011) we propose individuals’ rational self-interest and social diversity as the motivators for
tolerant/intolerant behaviour, and social cost allows us to take into account the role played by inter-group differences as
religion or ethnicity, which can not be captured by only considering pure economic incentives. In line with Alesina-La
Ferrara (2005), ’contacts across different types of agents produce negative utility’.
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(3) ∂
2c1
∂x1∂x2
≤ 0, ∂2c2∂x2∂x1 ≤ 0;
(4) ci = 0 if x1 = x2 = 1.
Condition (1) states that the individual cost increases when the shares of intolerant people
increase, while by condition (2) the higher the share of tolerant people in the agent’s group, the
lower the reduction in the cost generated by an increase in such a share. Condition (3) states that
the social cost reduction produced by an increase in the share of tolerant individuals in the agent’s
group increases with an increase in the share of tolerant individuals of the other group. This means
that the incentive to tolerance grows as the opposite group becomes more tolerant, i.e. tolerance is
much more rewarding if it is reciprocal. Finally, condition (4) states that individual social costs are
zero if there are no intolerant people in both groups.
The parameter β ≥ 0 may be viewed as a measure of intolerants’ ’fundamentalism’; when β is high,
intolerant agents are strongly adverse to the members of the other group and the individual social
costs deriving by mixed interaction are high.
Let Pxixj the probability that a tolerant agent of group i interacts with a tolerant agent of group j,
Pxixˆj the probability that a tolerant individual of group i meets an intolerant individual of group j,
Pxˆixj the probability that an intolerant member of group i meets with a tolerant member of group
j and Pxˆixˆj the probability that an intolerant of group i meets an intolerant of group j. We obtain
the following probabilities:
Px1x1 =
x1N1 − 1
N − 1 , Px1xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1
N − 1 , Px1x2 =
x2N2
N − 1 , Px1xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2
N − 1 ,
Pxˆ1x1 =
x1N1
N − 1 , Pxˆ1xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1 − 1
N − 1 , Pxˆ1x2 =
x2N2
N − 1 , Pxˆ1xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2
N − 1 ,
Px2x2 =
x2N2 − 1
N − 1 , Px2xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2
N − 1 , Px2x1 =
x1N1
N − 1 , Px2xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1
N − 1 ,
Pxˆ2x2 =
x2N2
N − 1 , Pxˆ2xˆ2 =
xˆ2N2 − 1
N − 1 , Pxˆ2x1 =
x1N1
N − 1 , Pxˆ2xˆ1 =
xˆ1N1
N − 1 .
Now, in order to provide more intuitive insights into the dynamics of tolerance, we will give an
explicit shape of the cost function, supposing that:
ci(x1, x2) = β(1− x1x2) (2)
αi(piii) = piii. (3)
Given the above probabilities the expected payoffs of tolerant and intolerant individuals in group i
are, respectively:
E[xi] = piii (Pxixi + Pxixˆi) + [piij − piii − β(1− xixj)]Pxixj , (4)
and
E[xˆi] = piii (Pxˆixi + Pxˆixˆi) , (5)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j.
To study the evolutionary dynamics of tolerance we will use the theory of replicators (Weibull
1998). Being N very large, we will consider the version of the replicator which is related to an
infinite population. This is a simplifying assumption, which has the good feature to provide a more
intuitive and meaningful economic analysis. The motion of tolerant population in group 1 with
respect to time t will be then modeled by the following differential equation:
x˙1 = x1xˆ1
(
E[x1] − E[xˆ1]
)
. (6)
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By repeating the same procedure for group 2, we can obtain a second differential equation that, along
with equation (6), produces a system of two differential equations giving a complete description of
tolerance dynamics: 
x˙1 = x1xˆ1x2N2N−1 [pi12 − pi11 − β (1− x1x2)] ,
x˙2 = x2xˆ2x1N1N−1 [pi21 − pi22 − β (1− x1x2)] .
(7)
The dynamics is assumed to start at an initial state
(
x01, x
0
2
)
.
By applying equation (6), we have that the trajectories described in (7) are always into the phase
plane:
F =
{(
xt1, x
t
2
)
: 0 ≤ xt1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xt2 ≤ 1, ∀ t > 0
}
,
for every starting point
(
x01, x
0
2
) ∈ F and time t ≥ 0.
By solving (7), we derive the steady states of the dynamical system set on the boundaries of the
phase plane F : 
P1 = (0, ψ) ; ψ ∈ (0, 1] ;
P2 = (ξ, 0) ; ξ ∈ (0, 1] ;
P3 = (1, 1) ;
P4 = (0, 0) ;
P5 =
(
1, pi22−pi21+ββ
)
;
P6 =
(
pi11−pi12+β
β , 1
)
.
(8)
and all the steady states (x1, x2) within the phase plane F , derived by calculating the intersection
of the isokine curves3 x2 = pi11−pi12+ββx1 ≡ Ω1 and x2 =
pi22−pi21+β
βx1
≡ Ω2 with xi 6= {0, 1} i = 1, 2 that
is:
P7 = {(x1, x2) : x1 ∈ (0, 1) , x2 ∈ (0, 1) , Ω1 = Ω2} . (9)
The steady states have a precise economic and social meaning. Points P1 and P2 depict situations
where one group (respectively group 1 and group 2) is wholly populated by intolerant agents. Point
P3 is the most preferable situation, given that all population agents are tolerant and social conflicts
are absent; on the contrary, point P4 depicts a society characterized by totally intolerant agents.
Finally, in points P5 and P6 the population of one group is completely tolerant while, in point P7,
tolerant and intolerant agents exist in both social groups. The point P3 is of particular interest for
our purpose being such a steady state related to the case of full tolerance. We will focus on it our
attention.
The following facts will turn out to be useful:
1. if at a given time t we have xt2 > Ωi i = 1, 2 then x˙i > 0;
2. if x2 = 1 and x1 > pi11−pi12+ββ ≡ γ1 then x˙1 > 0;
3. if x1 = 1 and x2 > pi22−pi21+ββ ≡ γ2 then x˙2 > 0.
Phase diagrams 1 and 2 show all possible scenarios about the dynamics of tolerance. More specifi-
cally, Phase diagram 1 exhibits the entire range of opportunities in which trajectories can converge
to the point (1, 1) of full tolerance when P3 is a stable equilibrium. Phase diagram 2 shows all the
opportunities when the point (1, 1) is unstable. If we observe phase diagrams, we can notice that a
necessary condition in order to say that tolerance spreads in both groups is γi < 1, ∀i = 1, 2. Such a
condition is not sufficient because convergence towards the equilibrium point (1, 1) is possible only
for sufficiently high value of x0i , for i = 1, 2
4.
3Isokine curves are obtained by imposing
pi12 − pi11 − β (1− x1x2) = 0;
pi21 − pi22 − β (1− x1x2) = 0,
with x1 ∈ (0, 1) and x2 ∈ (0, 1).
4In line with Muldoon et al. (2011) we observe that a ’uniformly intolerant society will have a hard time becoming
less intolerant, precisely because there are no examples of tolerance to learn from’.
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Phase diagram 1 also shows that only in panel (1f) with γi < 0 convergence to the point (1, 1) is
realized for any starting point different from the equilibria in the phase plane F .
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Condition γi < 1 is verified if and only if piij −piii > 0 ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Therefore, the spread
of tolerance is wider when the payoffs obtained in mixed interactions are higher than the payoffs
resulting from the interactions between two members of the same group.
This fact forces us to give a more comprehensive description of payoffs; to be more precise, we assume
that every interaction between two agents of groups i and j produces aggregate wealth Rij (ki, kj)
that is distributed between them and then consumed. The produced wealth depends on the (physical
and human) capital contributed by both agents. If the two agents are members of the same group,
they divide wealth equally. If they are members of two different social groups, produced wealth is
not equally divided. In this case we call the shares of wealth of the group i member with δi and with
δj = 1 − δi the share of the other one. More precisely, we suppose that δi depends on the relative
contribution of capital ki, namely δi ≡ kiki+kj . A different portion of wealth can be justified assuming
differences in group productivity or different initial (human and physical) capital endowment5. We
assume that members of group 1 are in general richer than members of group 2 so that 12 < δ1 < 1
and given that R12 = R21 ≡ R2 payoffs become: pi11 =
1
2R11; pi12 = δ1R2,
pi22 = 12R22; pi21 = (1− δ1)R2,
(10)
where R11 > R2 > R22 > 0. The analysis of the phase diagrams and the payoff structure in (10)
gives the following result:
Proposition 1. The necessary condition in order that tolerance spreads in both groups is δ1 ∈
[Ψ1,Ψ2], where Ψ1 ≡ 12 R11R2 and Ψ2 ≡ 1− 12 R22R2 .
Proof: From system (7) we observe that x˙1 > 0 and x˙2 > 0 require respectively pi12 > pi11 and
pi21 > pi22. Using payoffs in (10) we obtain δ1 > 12
R11
R2
from the first condition and δ1 < 1 − 12 R22R2
from the second one. ¤
Remark 1. Note that Ψi > 12 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} but it is not necessarily true that Ψ1 < Ψ2. More
precisely 12 < Ψ2 < 1 and Ψ1 >
1
2 . Furthermore, from (10) it is easy to show that:
Ψ1 < Ψ2 iff R11 < 2R2 −R22, (11)
from which we derive the following results:
Corollary to proposition 1.
1. Tolerance is impossible if Ψ1 > Ψ2 for any δ1 ∈ [0, 1]. R2 is not sufficiently high and, therefore,
there is no economic incentive to mixed interaction.
2. Imposing fairness in the allocation of wealth R2 (i.e. if δ1 → 12), reduces the level of tolerance.
Since Ψ1 > 12 , Proposition 1. gives that a necessary condition for the spread of tolerance is
δ1 > 1/2. The borderline case of δ1 = 1/2 is associated with fair distribution of wealth R2.
Hence, γ1 > 1 and γ2 < 1, and the system is that reported in panels 2h and 2l, where the
equilibrium (1, 1) with full tolerance is clearly unstable. Given that R11 > R22, when δ = 1/2
the agents of group 1 have no economic incentive to cooperate with the agents of group 2.
5These hypotheses are reasonable if, for example, we consider a group of natives owning most of the production
factors and a group of migrants with low skills (Darity et al., 2006; Hazary and Sgro, 2003; Moy and Hip, 2006) or
if we assume that ”one racial group has racial privilege in exercising control over both public and private resources
while members of the other groups do not have such power” (Darity et al., 2006).
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3. If there are no differences in productivity between the groups, then R11 = R22 = R2 and
intolerance spreads.
With R11 = R22 = R2 we have Ψ1 = Ψ2 and at least one group (group 1 if δ1 < 12 , as in panel
2h, and group 2 if δ1 > 12 , in panel panel 2g) experiences a reduction in the share of tolerant
agents, x˙i < 0. Increasing intolerance in this group generates more costs for tolerant agents
of both groups, producing a growing intolerance in the other group as well. If δ1 = 12 the
system is described by panel 2i. In the long run, at least one group will be entirely composed
of intolerant agents. We conclude that between two different social groups of agents with the
same productivity, a conflict is inevitable.
A sufficient condition to have tolerance in both populations is summarized in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2. A sufficient condition for the spread of tolerance in both groups at any start-
ing point
(
x01, x
0
2
) ∈ F is γi < 0 ∀i = 1, 2, that is 1/2 < Γ1 < δ1 < Γ2 < 1, where Γ1 = Ψ1 + βR2 and
Γ2 = Ψ2 − βR2 .
Proof: From panel 1f we observe that all trajectories converge to the point (1, 1) if γ1 < 0 and
γ2 < 0. From γ1 < 0 we obtain δ1 >
1/2R11+β
R2
≡ Γ1 and from γ2 < 0 that δ1 < 1− 1/2R22+βR2 ≡ Γ2. ¤
Note that Γ1 < Γ2 if and only if R2 (Ψ2 −Ψ1) > 2β, which means that the spread of tolerance re-
quires economic incentives favoring inter-group interaction (Ψ1 < Ψ2, as stated in the necessary
condition) and sufficiently low tolerance costs (small β). Therefore, we can conclude that the diffu-
sion of tolerance is very difficult when social aversion to diversity becomes more marked.
3 Welfare and policy
We assume the amount W of expected payoffs of each agent as a suitable measure of total welfare
in the steady state Pj :
W(x1,x2) =
2∑
i=1
(
E[xi]Nixi + E[xˆi]Nixˆi
)
. (12)
When γ1 ∈ (0, 1) and γ2 ∈ (0, 1), then steady states P5 and P6 are always unstable (see phase
diagrams in figures 1 and 2) and are not taken into consideration in the welfare analysis. On the
contrary, equilibrium points P1, P2, P3 and P4 can be stable or unstable according to the values
assumed by γ1 and γ2, and therefore, they constitute the core of the welfare analysis6.
By substituting (4) and (5) into the welfare equation (12), and assuming NiNi−1 ≈ 1, we obtain the
following levels of welfare:
WP1 ≈ pi22 (ψN2 − 1)− pi11, (13)
WP2 ≈ pi11 (ξN1 − 1)− pi22, (14)
WP3 ≈ (pi11 + pi21)N1 + (pi22 + pi12)N2 − (pi11 + pi22) ; (15)
WP4 ≈ − (pi11 + pi22) . (16)
From comparison we observe that
WP3 > max{WP1 ,WP2 ,WP4}. (17)
6The assumption R11 > R2 > R22 rules out the equlibrium point P7.
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Therefore, welfare maximization requires total tolerance between the groups. Government policies
must promote tolerance to maximize welfare and favor a fair distribution of wealth; however, since
our model predicts a trade-off between wealth distribution and diffusion of tolerance, this can be a
very hard task. Let’s assume, for example, that a population is formed by two conflicting groups
with Ψ1 < Ψ2 and is characterized by a high level of intolerance. In this case, a policymaker’s first
objective should be that of satisfying condition (12) by favouring cultural integration, that is by
reducing β, and maintaining inequality, so that the sufficient condition Γ1 < δ1 < Γ2 is satisfied. In
this case, the dynamics are that of phase plane (f) in figure 1, where groups attitudes converge to
full tolerance. When the state of the population is sufficiently close to the steady state point (1, 1),
then we can realize economic integration, reducing δ and the productivity gap between the groups
(which is making Ψ1 ≈ 1/2 and Ψ2 = Ψ1 + ²), but mantaining necessary condition Ψ1 < δ1 < Ψ2.
At this point, dynamics will be described by one of the phase planes from (a) to (e) in figure 1;
disparities will be significantly reduced and tolerance will spread in both groups. It is important to
remark the fact that a different policy where economic integration precedes cultural integration does
not produce social tolerance.
4 Conclusions
Usually we think that the tolerance between two different social groups is a natural consequence of
economic integration, defined as fairer distribution of wealth among people. Our model contradicts
this idea; in fact, even if it confirms that a large gap between wealth endowments of different groups
produces intolerance, when we assume no differences (R11 = R22 = R2) or impose fairness in the
allocation of wealth produced by economic interaction (δ → 1/2), i.e. economic integration, we
obtain the counterintuitive result that intolerance increases and aggregate wealth reduces. Thus,
tolerance requires that a group must be richer than the other. However, such a phenomenon is
reduced by sufficiently low tolerance costs; more precisely, when the perception of diversity existing
between the agents of different groups becomes negligible, these groups can freely cooperate in
economic interactions without incurring in economic and social retaliation. By defining a society
with low tolerance costs (β → 0) as culturally integrated, we conclude that cultural integration must
precede economic integration; fairness and equity without a corresponding decrease in the perception
of diversity will produce intolerance. The conclusions derived from this analysis are solely based
on the assumption of the existence of static wealth. In the real world, we observe that physical
and human capital and production are dynamic; therefore, future research will have to focus on the
impact of intergroup tolerance on economic growth models, where the mathematical law of motion
of capital is also affected by the level of social tension.
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